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Peru has successfully pursued a market-driven financial de-dollarization during the last 
decade. Dollarization of credit and deposit of commercial banks—across all sectors and 
maturities—has declined, with larger declines for commercial credit and time and saving 
deposits. The analysis presented in this paper confirms that de-dollarization has been driven 
by macroeconomic stability, introduction of prudential policies to better reflect currency risk 
(such as the management of reserve requirements), and the development of the capital market 
in soles. Further de-dollarization efforts could focus on these three fronts. Given the now 
consolidated macroeconomic stability, greater exchange rate flexibility could foster de-
dollarization; additional prudential measures could further discourage banks’ lending and 
funding in foreign currency; while further capital market development in domestic currency 
would help overall financial de-dollarization. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Dollarization in Peru started with the inflationary process of the mid-70s and peaked 
during the hyperinflation of 1988−90, despite efforts to de-dollarize in 1985. With high 
inflation, the U.S. dollar started to be the preferred means of payments and store of value. 
Lending institutions also saw that dollars minimize the risk of capital losses. 
Consequently, financial dollarization rose significantly (Figure 1).
2  In 1985, while 
inflation was high, the government forced the conversion of foreign currency deposits to 
local currency, resulting in capital flight and financial disintermediation. When the 
restriction on foreign currency deposits was lifted, re-dollarization was quick, and by the 
end-1990s, about 80 percent of deposits (and credit) were denominated in foreign 
currency. 
 
Since the introduction of the inflation targeting (IT) regime in early 2000s, Peru has 
experienced a gradual and sustained market-driven financial de-dollarization.
3  
Dollarization of credit has declined by nearly 25 percentage points during 2001−2009 to 
below 55 percent by end-2009 (Figure 1). Dollarization of deposits has also declined by a 
similar amount to about 52 percent.
4 Transaction dollarization has also declined and is 
now minimal (see Table 1).  
  














                                                 
2 Financial dollarization occurs when a large share of residents’ assets and liabilities are denominated in 
foreign currency. Dollarization ratios in the paper refer to commercial banks, unless noted otherwise. 
3 Other countries in Latin America with widespread dollarization have also experienced a process of 
market-driven de-dollarization during the last decade, including Bolivia, Uruguay and Paraguay. 
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Checks 2/ 26.2 26.3 25.1 24.8 24.4 19.4 18.1
Cash withdraw
Debit cards 21.6 17.6 13.6 12.4 8.7 4.6 5.4
Credit cards 11.1 9.3 6.3 5.5 4.7 3.6 3.4
ATM 13.4 10.7 7.8 7.9 7.0 5.3 5.3
Source: BCRP.
1/ Percentage in value terms.
1/ Includes cashed checks at the bank, deposited at the bank, and processed 
at the electronic clearing house.
(percentage of check and cash payments operations made in dollars)1/
Table 1. Peru: Transaction dollarization
 
 
While a great deal of work exists on the financial consequences of dollarization, the 
empirical literature on the process of de-dollarization is scant. While it is widely accepted 
that hyperinflation is one of the driving factors in financial dollarization when indexed 
instruments are not readily available, the persistence of high ratios of dollarized deposits 
and loans after periods in which inflation has fallen substantially is still a puzzle. Ize and 
Levy-Yeyati (2003) develop a model of optimal portfolio choice of risk-averse borrowers 
and lenders where the equilibrium level of deposit dollarization depends on the relative 
price and real exchange rate volatility. Specifically, their minimum variance portfolio 
(MVP) model implies that if real exchange depreciation is less volatile than inflation, 
then, consumers would prefer the dollar deposit as it is less risky. The authors test the 
model using cross-section data on deposit dollarization for 23 countries. De Nicolo et al. 
(2005) and Rennack and Nozaki (2006) confirm the MVP hypothesis. Another strand of 
literature highlights the role of currency-blind regulatory frameworks—for example, 
Broda and Levy-Yeyati (2003) argue that an explicit deposit insurance that applies 
uniformly across all deposits exacerbates deposit dollarization. Kokenyne and Veyrune 
(2008) and Erasmus et al. (2009) review international experience with dedollarization and 
conclude that dollarization is not easily reversed, even after the underlying causes have 
been removed. The authors highlight that successful attempts to dedollarize have been 
market-based and combined a track record of macroeconomic stability with other policies 
to enhance the attractiveness of the local currency. 
 
This paper explores the factors that explain bank de-dollarization in Peru. The 
contributing role of three groups of factors—macroeconomic stability, prudential 
regulations and development of the capital market in soles—to the process of banks’ de-
dollarization is examined. In contrast with the literature that focuses exclusively on 
dollarization of overall deposits, this paper examines simultaneously the dollarization of 
deposits and credits. By estimating deposits and credits simultaneously, banks’ response 
to the different factors that may impact dollarization is taken into consideration. The 
paper also examines the drivers of de-dollarization across categories of deposits and 
credits. 
  4 
  
The findings confirm that Peru bank de-dollarization has been the result of a three-prong 
approach. Macroeconomic stability, proxied by inflation, different measures of exchange 
rate changes, and sovereign credit risk (EMBI), had a significant impact on de-
dollarization. Prudential measures, such as the introduction of asymmetric reserve 
requirements and provisions for currency-induced credit risk, had an impact on banks’ 
incentives to borrow and lend in soles. Last, the development of the local capital market 
in soles had a mixed impact on bank de-dollarization. The issuance of long-term 
treasuries in soles lowered dollarization of credit, probably by facilitating bank funding 
and pricing of long-term loans in soles. However, other sol market instruments led to 
higher bank dollarization—these may have competed with bank loans in soles, having an 
impact on the pool of bank borrowers. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the de-dollarization 
trend of credit and deposits, and explores in detail the de-dollarization of credit by sectors 
and of deposits by maturity structure. This section decomposes the changes in credit 
(deposit) dollarization into a within and between component. Section III describes the 
three groups of factors—specifically, macro-economic conditions, regulatory and 
prudential policy measures, and development of a capital market in soles—that could 
have affected banks and agents preferences for borrowing and lending in domestic 
currency. Section IV models the de-dollarization dynamics using a vector autoregression 
approach, and identifies the factors that have boosted de-dollarization in recent years. 
Based on the empirical findings, section V outlines measures that could help further 
deepen and consolidate de-dollarization. Section VI concludes. 
 
II.   DE-DOLLARIZATION—STYLIZED FACTS 
A.   De-dollarization trend by type of credit and deposits
5 
De-dollarization has been gradual.  Peru has experienced a gradual financial de-
dollarization since early 2000s. A sharp deposit de-dollarization took place in late-2007 
and that was quickly reversed following the collapse of Lehman Brothers (Figure 2.a.). 
The return to trend de-dollarization during 2008 resulted from an increase in foreign 
currency deposits while domestic currency deposits remained stable. 
 
Dollarization varies across types of loans and deposits. Dollarization of loans with longer 
maturities (mortgages and commercial) is higher than loans with shorter maturities 
(consumer and small businesses) (Figure 2.b.). Dollarization of demand and savings 
deposits, which are more liquid, is lower than time-deposits (Figure 2.c.). 
 
                                                 
5 To avoid the impact of valuation changes, deposits and credits in foreign currency are evaluated at a 
constant exchange.  5 
  
Figure 2. Peru: De-dollarization of Credit by Sectors and of Deposits by Maturity 
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Deposit dollarization Credit dollarization
1/ Foreign currency credit and deposits evaluated at constant exchange rate.


























2001m1 2002m1 2003m1 2004m1 2005m1 2006m1 2007m1 2008m1 2009m1
month1
Deposits in domestic currency Credit in domestic currency
Deposits in foreign currency Credit in foreign currency
1/ Foreign currency credit and deposits evaluated at constant exchange rate.
(millions of Soles)
Peru: Credit and deposits by currency 1/
 
       Sources: BCRP; and IMF staff calculations.            Sources: BCRP; and IMF staff calculations.  
 












2001m1 2002m1 2003m1 2004m1 2005m1 2006m1 2007m1 2008m1 2009m1
month1
Commercial credit dollarization Small business credit dollarization
Consumer credit dollarization Mortgage dollarization
1/ Foreign credit evaluated at constant exchange rate.






















2001m1 2002m1 2003m1 2004m1 2005m1 2006m1 2007m1 2008m1 2009m1
month1
Commercial in domestic currency Commercial in foreign currency
1/ Foreign credit evaluated at constant exchange rate.
















2001m1 2002m1 2003m1 2004m1 2005m1 2006m1 2007m1 2008m1 2009m1
month1
Small business domestic currency Small business foreign currency
Consumer domestic currency Consumer foreign currency
Mortgage domestic currency Mortgage foreign currency
1/ Foreign credit evaluated at constant exchange rate.
Peru: Credit by sector and currency (millions of Soles) 1/
          
Sources: SBS; and IMF staff calculations. 













2001m1 2002m1 2003m12004m1 2005m1 2006m1 2007m1 2008m1 2009m1
month1
Vista deposits dollarization Savings deposit dollarization
Time deposits dollarization
1/ Foreign deposits evaluated at constant exchange rate.
(in percent)
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1/ Foreign currency deposits evaluated at constant exchange rate.


























2001m1 2002m1 2003m1 2004m1 2005m1 2006m1 2007m1 2008m1 2009m1
month1
Saving deposits--domestic currency Time deposits--domestic currency
Saving deposits--foreign currency Time deposits--foreign currency
1/ Foreign currency deposits evaluated at constant exchange rate.
Peru: Deposits by currency (millions of Soles) 1/
 
     Sources: SBS; and IMF staff calculations.  
 
B.   Between and within de-dollarization 
This section decomposes de-dollarization of credit and deposits into a within and between 
component. Time-series data on aggregate credit dollarization captures not only de-
dollarization within sectors, but also compositional changes of credit among sectors. 
Similarly, data on aggregated deposit dollarization is influenced by compositional 
changes among deposits of difference maturity structure. Changes in credit dollarization 
through time can be decomposed as  6 
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where dit is dollarization of credit in sector i in year t, and cit is the total credit extended to 
sector i in year t. The first term captures the time-series changes in dollarization within 
sectors. The second term captures the effect of changes in credit composition. A similar 
decomposition can be done for deposits 
 
De-dollarization has been driven mainly by changes within each type of credit and 
deposits. The decomposition of credit de-dollarization through time into within and 
between components shows that credit de-dollarization has mostly been driven by within 
sector de-dollarization (Table 2.a.). The analysis also indicates that commercial sector de-
dollarization explains the bulk of total de-dollarization. All commercial sectors—with the 
exception of fishing, mining, and electricity/water/gas—contributed to the commercial 
credit de-dollarization process (Appendix). The within and between decomposition for 
deposit de-dollarization reveals that de-dollarization within maturity explains almost all 
the decline in deposit dollarization (Table 2.b.). 
 
between within total
Sectors 2001 2009 2001 2009 effect effect effect
commercial 80.8 66.5 79.0 62.8 -10.7 -11.3 -22.0
small business 50.3 15.3 2.6 6.0 0.5 -0.9 -0.4
consumer 47.8 14.9 9.0 17.5 1.3 -3.0 -1.7
mortgage 94.1 59.9 9.4 13.7 2.5 -3.2 -0.7
total 78.3 53.5 100 100 -6.4 -18.4 -24.8
b. Deposits 1/
between within total
Maturities 2001 2009 2001 2009 effect effect effect
sight 58.7 49.6 19.1 29.5 5.2 -1.7 3.5
saving 71.7 46.9 32.1 27.6 -2.1 -8.0 -10.1
time 84.6 57.1 48.9 42.9 -3.4 -13.4 -16.8
total 75.5 52.1 100 100 -0.3 -23.1 -23.5
Table 2. Peru: Decomposition of de-dollarization into a within and between components
2001-2009 Share in total deposits
(in percent)
Dollarization
   1/ Credit and deposits in foreign currency are evaluated at a constant nominal exchange rate.
a. Credit  1/
Dollarization Share in total credit 2001-2009
(in percent)
 
   Sources: BCRP; SBS; and IMF staff calculation.
 
 
III.   CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND MEASURES 
A.   Macro pre-conditions—successful implementation of stabilization policies 
Dedollarization has followed the successful implementation of macroeconomic 
stabilization policies. Taking advantage of buoyant economic conditions in recent years, 
the Peruvian government has pursued large fiscal surpluses (of about 2.0-3.3 percent of 
GDP per year) during 2006-08. As a result, public debt has been reduced below 30  7 
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       Sources: BCRP; and IMF staff calculations.         Sources: BCRP; and IMF staff calculations. 
percent of GDP, one of the lowest levels in the region (Figure 3). The central bank, under 
the IT framework introduced in 2002 (initially with a target of 2.5 percent with a band of 
± 1 percent and since 2007 lowered to 2 percent with a band of ± 1 percent), has 
successfully contained inflation within the inflation target band and anchored 
expectations. Moreover, the central bank has built a significant buffer of international 
reserves, providing a credible assurance of its ability to provide support in case of stress.
6 
Last, thanks to stringent prudential regulations, Peru’s financial sector is sound, as shown 
by its resilience during the recent global financial crisis. 
 
Markets have acknowledged Peru’s outstanding performance. Peru was granted 
investment grade by Fitch, Standard & Poor’s in April and July 2008, respectively, and 
by Moody’s in December 2009, consolidating its standing among major emerging market 
economies. Peru EMBI stands at about 210 bps compared to 410 bps for Latin America 
as a whole in late-May 2010. 
 
Figure 3. Peru: Macroeconomic performance, 2000−09 
B.   Prudential measures 
Several prudential measures introduced during the last decade have helped the de-
dollarization process by lowering banks’ incentives to borrow and lend in foreign 
currency. These measures include:
7 
 
•  Reserve requirements (RR). The difference between the RR on foreign currency 
deposits and domestic currency deposits has changed during the period of analysis 
                                                 
6 Net international reserves increased from US$ 9.6 billion in 2002 to US$ 33.1 billion in 2009. 
7 In addition to the financial prudential measures listed below, the following regulatory measure may have 
an impact on the demand for local currency. In particular, the Consumer Protection Law was amended in 
2004 forcing retailers and wholesalers to list prices in domestic currency. However, the law leaves agents 
free to list prices also in dollars.  8 
  
(Figure 4). The remuneration that the central bank pays on reserves has changed too. 
Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of the remuneration rate for deposits in either 
currency above the 6 percent level (which is the current level of non-remunerated 
reserve requirement applied to all deposits). 
•  Provisioning requirements. Since mid-2006, banks have to carry out a routine 
evaluation of currency risks, or alternatively, set up a reserve ranging from 0.25 
percent to 1 percent of the credit in foreign currency that has not been evaluated.
8 As 
of 2009, additional provisions for foreign currency risk as a percent of total 
provisions are marginal. 
Additional prudential measures linked to currency exposures are in place, but these have 
not been modified during the period of analysis. These measures are: 
 
•  Liquidity requirements. Banks are required to hold liquid assets equivalent to at least 
8 percent in domestic currency and 20 percent in foreign currency of all their 
liabilities maturing during the next 12 months. 
•  Banks’ net open position. In addition to limiting banks’ foreign currency exposure, 
there are in Peru capital requirements on open foreign exchange positions. The limit 
to banks’ long (short) open position was changed to 75 (15) percent of capital in 
February 2010, from a previous limit of 100 (10) percent of capital.
9 















1/ In percent of liabilities subjet to reserve requirements.
MEX stands for foreign currency. MN stands for domestic currency.
Peru: Required reserve requirement rate (in percent) 1/
 
     Sources: BCRP; and IMF staff calculations.                      Sources: BCRP; and IMF staff calculations. 
 
                                                 
8 Cayazzo et al. (2006) indicate that only Peru among 17 surveyed countries that are partially dollarized 
reports requiring higher provisions for foreign currency loans relative to domestic currency ones.  
9 Cayazzo et al (2006) indicate that Poland, Singapore and Sweden have capital charges on foreign 
exchange exposures. Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras and Uruguay have only limits on 
these exposures. The remaining of the 17 countries surveyed, including Peru, have both capital charges and 
































































































































































Peru:Reserve requirements--remuneration rate (in percent) 9 
  
C.   Development of a capital financial market in soles 
Peru has been actively developing its public and private debt market in domestic currency 
in recent years. 
 
•  Domestic public debt market. In 2003, Peru launched a market-making program with 
the objective of developing a market for domestic public debt, consisting mainly of 
fixed-rate instruments in domestic currency.
10,11 In line with this objective, Peru’s 
public debt management strategy has been focused on developing a yield curve of 
government bonds in soles and reducing the share of public debt denominated in 
foreign currency (Figure 5.a.). As a result, government bonds in soles have gained 
liquidity and the yield curve has been extended considerably.
12,13 
•  Private debt market. Private bond issuances in local currency have also increased 
substantially in recent years (Figure 5.b.). 
 
Figure 5. Peru: Development of debt market in domestic currency 
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Peru: Domestic sovereign yield curve
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Sources: BCRP; and IMF staff calculations.         Sources: SBS; and IMF staff calculations. 
 
                                                 
10 Ministerial Resolution 106-2003; Supreme Decree 189-2004; and Supreme Decree 137-2005. 
11 The two types of domestic public bonds (known as Soberanos) are the fixed-coupon “Tasa Fija” bonds 
and the inflation adjusted, “VAC” bonds. The Tasa Fija bonds are the most liquid instruments and represent 
nearly 90 percent of Soberanos.  
12 The longest maturity of fixed-rate government paper in domestic currency is 32 years, as of February 
2010. It was 5 years in 2003. The VAC curve extends up to 39-year tenors, but has limited liquidity, as the 
total outstanding amount is US$700 million. 
13 Reflecting the availability of domestic debt instruments in soles, the portfolio of local pension funds 
(AFPs) denominated in dollars declined to 32 percent in November 2008 from 50 percent in 2000, and has 
recently increased to 41 percent in December 2009 as the limits on AFP foreign investments have been 
raised. AFPs hold more than 50 percent of the stock of Soberanos, followed by foreign investors (21 
percent), local banks (15 percent), and insurance companies (4 percent).  10 
  
 
Figure 5. Peru: Development of debt market in domestic currency (cont.) 
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Sources: BCRP; and IMF staff calculations.         Sources: BCRP; and IMF staff calculations. 
 
 
IV.   UNDERSTANDING DE-DOLLARIZATION 
Dollarization reflects the choice of currency by depositors, borrowers and banks. 
Dollarization of credits and deposits reflect the equilibrium in the credit and deposit 
markets: banks supply loanable funds and demand deposits, and the private sector 
demands credit and provides funding. Banks, in turn, are active intermediaries between 
creditors and depositors. Data on quantities of credit and deposits and on lending and 
deposit rates correspond to the equilibrium in these markets. Figure 6 depicts in the 
vertical axis the ratio of lending (active) rates in foreign to domestic currency. 
 
Peru’s de-dollarization process is consistent with a shift of both demand of credit and 
supply of deposits toward soles. The null hypothesis of stable demand would imply that 
dollarization of credit (deposits) and the ratio of lending (active) rates in foreign to 
domestic currency negatively covary.
14 Shaded areas in Figure 6 appear to be consistent 
with rejecting the null, thereby with a shift in the demand of credit toward soles 
particularly for commercial loans since 2006. Other patterns, such as those highlighted in 
the deposits market, would be consistent with supply shifts. 
                                                 
14 The hypothesis of stable demand for credit in dollars implies that 
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where iit is the lending rate to sector i in year t.   11 
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Peru: Deposit rates by maturity,
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Peru: Credit dollarization and lending rates by sector,
2001-2009 (quarterly data)




















































Peru: Deposit dollarization and interest rates by maturity,
2001-2009 (quarterly data)
vista ahorro plazo-360  
Sources: BCRP; and IMF staff calculations.             Sources: BCRP; and IMF staff calculations. 
 
A VAR approach allows modeling the dynamics between dollarization of credits and 
deposits. Such an approach avoids imposing a particular structure to credit and deposit 
dollarization. It permits to capture (i) the simultaneous determination of credit and 
deposit dollarization, (ii) the response to exogenous factors that are demand or supply 
shifters, and (iii) the dynamics of credit and deposit dollarization.
15  
 
Two VAR specifications are estimated using monthly data for the period 2001−2009. The 
first specification includes dollarization of total credit and total deposits, both in first 
differences, as endogenous variables. The second includes six endogenous variables, in 
first differences: dollarization of commercial credit, consumer credit, mortgages, demand 
deposits, savings deposit, and time deposits.
16 Both specifications include a set of 
                                                 
15 Granger causality was verified from deposit to credit dollarization. 
16 All series are valued at constant nominal exchange rate. The series of total credit and deposit 
dollarization used for the analysis in this section are constructed using December 2008 weights to avoid 
composition changes among types of credit and among types of deposits. Cointegration tests were 
performed in both specifications but rejected. Cointegration tests allowing for structural breaks were not 
performed as the period under analysis is characterized by macroeconomic stability and coincides with the 
introduction of the IT framework. Dollarization series in first-differences are I(0) processes.  12 
  
exogenous variables to proxy macro-stability, changes to prudential measures, and 
development of the capital market in soles. Table 3 presents the definition of the 
exogenous variables, and Figure 7 depicts the endogenous and exogenous data series.
17 
Further work could model some of the exogenous variables as endogenous. 
 
The VAR estimation results of the aggregate model are presented in Table 4. Figure 8 
depicts, for several of the exogenous variables, the impact of a unit increase to the 
exogenous variables on credit and deposit dollarization over time. The findings are: 
 
•  Macroeconomic variables. Inflation is not significant suggesting that it is not an 
important driver of dollarization once inflation and expectations are well-
contained—as it has been the case in Peru for the estimation period. Appreciation 
spikes are important for explaining de-dollarization of credits and deposits. An 
appreciation spike equivalent to appreciations greater than 1 percent for two 
consecutive months results in a decline of the dollarization rate of 0.5 percentage 
points over time (Figure 8). After controlling for sharp exchange rate movements, 
the remaining exchange rate variability further helps to lower dollarization of 
credit. Under historical variability of the exchange rate over the last two years, the 
decline in credit dollarization will be 2.5 percentage points per year. The inclusion 
of EMBI changes in the regression measures the impact of macroeconomic 
stability not reflected in exchange rate movements. 
•  Market development. The issuance of long-term treasury bonds in soles fosters 
de-dollarization as the development of a sol yield curve helps bank funding and 
pricing of long-term credit in soles. Results indicate that as the share of private 
sector bonds issued in domestic currency increases, dollarization of credit 
increases too. This could be due to the fact that this variable is capturing 
instruments competing with bank lending in soles, and as a consequence 
dollarization of banking credit rises. However, overall credit in soles in the 
economy increases.  
The VAR specification with disaggregated credit and deposits confirms the findings of 
the aggregate model and provides further insights on the drivers of de-dollarization. 
Results are presented in Table 5 and a selection of dynamic multipliers is included in 
Figure 9. 
 
•  Macroeconomic variables. Consistent with the aggregate model, exchange rate spikes 
matter for de-dollarization. Appreciation spikes foster de-dollarization of commercial 
credit, while depreciation spikes are associated with higher dollarization of 
mortgages. Once we control for sharp exchange rate movements, volatility of the 
                                                 
17 A dummy variable for the 2004 legal change forcing retailers to list prices in domestic currency was 
tested as an explanatory variable but it was not significant; thus, this variable was not included in the set of 
exogenous variables used in the paper.   13 
  
exchange rate lowers dollarization of commercial credit. Inflation seems to promote 
dollarization of time-deposits. 
•  Prudential variables. Higher RR spreads lower dollarization, specifically, for 
commercial credit. The introduction of higher provisions for foreign currency loans 
helped lower dollarization of mortgages, but this result merits further analysis as  the 
dummy variable could be capturing other events that took place around the time this 
measure was introduced, such as the reduction in the IT band since 2007.
18 
•  Market development. The issuance of long-term treasury bonds in soles, promotes de-
dollarization of credit. The coefficients on treasury bonds with terms of 10−15 years 
and 15−20 years are significant for commercial credit. As found in the aggregate 
model, the increase in the share of bonds issued in soles raises dollarization of credit, 
in particular, of credit extended to the commercial sector, which supports the 
explanation that some of the private debt instruments issued in soles compete with 
banks loans in soles.  
V.   NEXT STEPS 
To consolidate and deepen the de-dollarization process in Peru, a range of measures 
could play a role. 
 
•  Macro-economic related. The IT framework and consolidated policy credibility, 
reflecting strengthened institutions and a track record of prudent policies, have been 
key to keep inflation expectations well anchored, which are essential to the de-
dollarization process. Moreover, the successful policy response during the global 
financial crisis has further increased currency credibility. In this context, some further 
exchange rate flexibility, while avoiding extreme depreciations, could foster the de-
dollarization process. 
•  Prudential measures. Regulatory measures can also promote funding and lending in 
domestic currency. Provisions and capital requirements for foreign currency lending 
to un-hedged domestic borrowers could be periodically reassessed to ensure that the 
foreign exchange credit risk remains well internalized. The development of mortgage 
covered bonds in soles, which is being promoted by the Peruvian authorities, will 
help banks to finance mortgages in soles.
19 
•  Development of a capital market in soles. Deepening long-term funding and pricing 
in soles will enhance de-dollarization, which would be supported by improving 
                                                 
18 The discontinuation of the provision of credit risk guarantees by MiVivienda (a government-sponsored 
housing program) for new mortgages denominated in foreign currency extended by financial institutions 
took place in January 2008. Therefore, this change in MiVivienda is not driving the results. 
19 Currently, the interest rate on mortgages in soles is fixed for the first five years and then converts to a 
variable rate that changes with the Limabor.  14 
  
further the Soberanos yield curve, and developing the repo market and the fixed-
floating swap curve. The development of long-term sol instruments indexed to the 
CPI could promote de-dollarization through the solarization of pensions.
20 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
Peru has successfully pursued a market-driven financial de-dollarization during the last 
decade, which has been based on a three-prong approach. The lines of action have 
included ensuring macroeconomic stability, effective management of reserve 
requirements and introduction of other prudential policies to better reflect currency risk, 
and the development of a capital market in soles. As a result, dollarization ratios of credit 
and deposit—across all sectors and maturities—have declined, with larger decline for 
commercial credit and time and saving deposits. 
Based on the results, the road ahead to further deepen de-dollarization could focus on the 
three fronts. Greater exchange rate variability, while maintaining macroeconomic 
stability and institutional credibility, can induce further credit de-dollarization. Additional 
prudential measures could further discourage lending and funding in foreign currency. 
Last, the capital market in domestic currency is still narrow—and although its 
development could compete with bank loans, all in all, it will help financial de-
dollarization. 
 
                                                 
20 Currently, regulation allows insurance companies to offer pensions in either dollars or soles VAC, but in 
practice, all pensions (about 95 percent) are denominated in dollars since availability of sol VAC 
instruments in the market is very limited. An alternative approach to promote de-dollarization of pensions 
would entail changing the legislation to permit pensions in nominal soles, and then, insurance companies 
would be able to offer pensions in soles adjusted with a fixed-factor, while hedging themselves with bonds 
in nominal soles.  15 
  
 
Appendix. Decomposition of Commercial and Small Business Sector De-
dollarization 
During the period 2001−2009, all commercial and small business sectors, with the 






































































































































































































































































































Peru: Dollarization by commercial sector, 2001-2009
2001 2009
 
        Source: SBS; and IMF staff calculations. 
 
The decomposition of de-dollarization between and within components shows that half of 
the de-dollarization experienced by the commercial and business sectors is explained by 
the decline in dollarization within sectors, with manufacturing, commerce and real estate 




Sector 2001 2009 2001 2009 effect effect effect
agriculture 90.1 73.8 3.2 2.7 -0.4 -0.4 -0.9
fishing 93.4 93.1 2.7 1.3 -1.4 0.0 -1.4
mining 94.9 95.5 6.3 3.9 -2.3 0.0 -2.3
manufacturing 84.6 67.5 22.7 18.3 -3.7 -3.1 -6.8
electricity, water, gas 75.8 86.4 3.4 4.4 0.8 0.5 1.3
construction 77.7 71.8 2.9 1.9 -0.8 -0.1 -0.9
commerce 68.1 49.3 18.4 14.0 -3.0 -2.6 -5.6
hotels 95.0 63.3 1.5 1.5 0.0 -0.5 -0.5
transport, storage, communication 68.1 43.1 4.4 6.1 1.2 -1.5 -0.4
financial 77.6 33.9 3.2 2.7 -0.4 -1.2 -1.6
real estate 84.5 58.7 6.1 5.4 -0.6 -1.4 -2.0
public administration, defense 36.3 8.8 0.9 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3
education 73.4 28.9 0.5 0.9 0.3 -0.4 -0.1
social services 67.5 44.9 0.4 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
other servicies 83.7 44.7 2.1 1.9 -0.1 -0.7 -0.9
private households, domestic service 84.4 62.0 2.8 2.9 0.1 -0.7 -0.6
total commercial and small businesses 79.8 61.4 81.6 68.6 -10.4 -12.7 -23.0
Source: SBS; and IMF staff calculations.
1/ Credits in foreign currency are evaluated at a constant nominal exchange rate.
(in percent)
Share in total credit 2001-2009
Peru: Decomposition of de-dollarization across commercial sectors
Dollarization
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Table 3. Definition of Exogenous Variables 
Macro-stability variables 
inflationt  Sum over t and t-1 of the monthly percentage change of the CPI. 
on depreciati
t d   Dummy equal to 1 if depreciation in t and t-1 exceeds 1 percent; 
zero, otherwise. 1/ 
on appreciati
t d   Dummy equal to 1 if appreciation in t, and t-1 exceeds 1 percent; 
zero, otherwise. 1/ 
et  Sum over t and t-1 of the monthly percentage change of the 
nominal exchange rate. 
st  Standard deviation of daily percentage change of the nominal 
exchange rate over 90-days 
Δembit  First-difference of the EMBI Peru, divided by 100. 
Prudential variables 
Δ RRt  Difference over t and t-2 of the spread between the required RR 
rate in foreign currency to the rate in domestic currency (in 
percent). 
2006
t d   Dummy equal to 1 starting in mid-2006 till mid-2007 to reflect 
the introduction of higher provisions for foreign currency loans; 
zero, otherwise. 
Soles capital market variables 
Δ share bonds in soles    First difference of the percentage of the stock of private sector 
bonds denominated in local currency. 
15 10−
t d   Dummy equal to 1 if during that month a treasury bond maturing 
in 10 up to 15 years was issued; zero, otherwise. 
20 15−
t d   Dummy equal to 1 if during that month a treasury bond maturing 
in 15 up to 20 years was issued; zero, otherwise. 
20
t d   Dummy equal to 1 if during that month a treasury bond maturing 
in 20 or more years; zero, otherwise. 
The exogenous variables are I(0) processes. 
1/ According to the definition for the depreciation and appreciation dummies, there are 7 episodes 




Table 4. Results of Aggregate VAR Model 











credit t-1 0.16* -0.42** 0.12 -0.34 0.08 -0.34 0.02 -0.42*
(0.10) (0.20) (0.10) (0.21) (0.10) (0.22) (0.10) (0.23)
Δdol
credit t-2 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.08
 (0.10) (0.20) (0.10) (0.20) (0.10) (0.21) (0.10) (0.22)
Δdol
deposit t-1 0.05 0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.09* 0.01
(0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.11)
Δdol
deposit t-2 -0.08** -0.07 -0.07 -0.12 -0.02 -0.13 -0.03 -0.13
(0.04) (0.09) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.11)
macrostability
inflationt -0.01 0.13 -0.04 0.17 -0.09 0.20 -0.09 0.22
(0.07) (0.14) (0.07) (0.14) (0.08) (0.17) (0.08) (0.17)
-0.41** -0.59* -0.43*** -0.59* -0.45*** -0.57 -0.45*** -0.72*
(0.16) (0.34) (0.16) (0.34) (0.17) (0.36) (0.17) (0.38)
0.27 0.49 0.25 0.56 0.32 0.51 0.27 0.41
(0.19) (0.40) (0.19) (0.40) (0.21) (0.44) (0.21) (0.46)
et -0.09*** 0.05 -0.08** 0.02 -0.09** 0.01 -0.08** 0.01
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08)
st -0.43 0.47 -0.47* 0.45 -0.54* 0.36 -0.49* 0.34
(0.27) (0.56) (0.27) (0.56) (0.28) (0.60) (0.28) (0.62)
Δembi 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.10 0.00 0.15
(0.09) (0.18) (0.09) (0.18) (0.09) (0.20) (0.09) (0.20)
prudential
ΔRRt -0.06 0.17 -0.10 0.17 -0.10 0.14
(0.07) (0.14) (0.07) (0.14) (0.07) (0.15)
d
2006
-0.20 0.05 -0.23* 0.07 -0.24 0.21
(0.13) (0.26) (0.13) (0.28) (0.17) (0.37)
capital market development
Δ share bonds in soles   0.07* -0.01 0.06 -0.03









  (0.15) (0.34)
Constant -0.07 -0.42*** -0.02 -0.45*** 0.00 -0.46*** 0.03 -0.43**
(0.07) (0.15) (0.07) (0.15) (0.08) (0.17) (0.08) (0.18)
Observations 105 105 105 105 94 94 94 94
R-squared 0.27 0.21 0.39 0.83 0.40 0.85 0.39 0.86
   Sources: IMF staff calculations.
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Table 5. Results of Six Variable VAR Specification 











commercial t-1 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.2 -0.43
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.26) (0.16) (0.27)
Δdol
commercial t-2 0.07 0.19*** 0.07 -0.09 -0.01 0.12
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.23) (0.14) (0.24)
Δdol
consumption t-1 0.35** -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.19 0.03
 (0.14) (0.11) (0.07) (0.35) (0.22) (0.37)
Δdol
consumption t-2 -0.19 0.14 -0.04 -0.19 0.21 -0.02
 (0.12) (0.09) (0.06) (0.29) (0.18) (0.30)
Δdol
mortgage
t-1 -0.34* -0.12 0.16* -0.84* -0.28 0.01
 (0.18) (0.13) (0.09) (0.45) (0.28) (0.47)
Δdol
mortgage
t-2 -0.12 0.17 0.41*** 0.76* 0.34 0.67
 (0.18) (0.14) (0.09) (0.46) (0.28) (0.48)
Δdol
vista t-1 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.53*** 0.13** 0.07
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10)
Δdol
vista
t-2 -0.02 -0.13*** -0.04** -0.28*** 0.03 -0.05
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10)
Δdol
saving
t-1 0.28*** 0.04 0.03 0.09 -0.32*** 0.31
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.18) (0.11) (0.19)
Δdol
saving
t-2 -0.04 0.02 0 -0.27* -0.17* 0.26
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.16) (0.10) (0.16)
Δdol
time
t-1 0.05 0 0.03 0.30*** 0.21*** -0.25**
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10)
Δdol
time
t-2 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.23** 0.08 -0.23**
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11)
macrostability
inflationt -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 -0.40 -0.17 0.93***
(0.11) (0.08) (0.06) (0.28) (0.17) (0.29)
-0.62** 0.20 0.02 -0.22 -0.31 -1.04
(0.25) (0.18) (0.12) (0.62) (0.38) (0.64)
0.23 0.31 0.37** 0.65 0.64 0.95
(0.31) (0.23) (0.16) (0.78) (0.47) (0.80)
et -0.11** -0.01 0.02 0.08 -0.01 -0.01
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.13) (0.08) (0.13)
st -1.24*** -0.12 -1.03*** -1.66 0.92 0.64
(0.45) (0.33) (0.23) (1.13) (0.69) (1.17)
Δembi 0.23* -0.16* -0.18*** 0.79** -0.39** 0.16
(0.13) (0.10) (0.06) (0.32) (0.20) (0.33)
prudential
ΔRRt -0.28*** 0.1 0 -0.01 0.14 0.28
(0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.25) (0.15) (0.26)
d2006t -0.31 -0.1 -0.23* -0.71 -0.27 1.10*
(0.25) (0.18) (0.13) (0.62) (0.38) (0.65)
capital market development
Δ share bonds in soles   0.15*** -0.05 0 0.13 -0.02 -0.08
(0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.15) (0.09) (0.15)
d
10-15 -0.53*** 0.2 0.04 -0.21 -0.61** -0.1
(0.18) (0.13) (0.09) (0.44) (0.27) (0.46)
d
15-20 -0.38* 0.37** -0.11 0.53 0.22 -0.42
(0.23) (0.17) (0.11) (0.57) (0.35) (0.59)
d
20 -0.36 0.19 -0.08 0.79 0.11 0.4
 (0.23) (0.17) (0.11) (0.56) (0.34) (0.59)
Constant 0.31** -0.36*** 0.08 0.22 -0.25 -0.69*
(0.15) (0.11) (0.07) (0.37) (0.23) (0.39)
Observations 94 94 94 94 94 94
R-squared 0.48 0.37 0.75 0.42 0.41 0.31
   Sources: IMF staff calculations.
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Figure 7. Data for the Empirical Analysis 
 
Endogenous variables 
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Figure 7. Data for the Empirical Analysis. (cont.) 
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       Source: IMF staff calculations. 
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Figure 8. Aggregate Model: Dynamic Impact of Selective Exogenous Variables 
 
a. Dynamic  multipliers 
 









0 5 0 5 0 5
depreciation, CREDIT depreciation, DEPOSITS apreciation, CREDIT
apreciation, DEPOSITS s, CREDIT s, DEPOSITS
step
 













0 5 0 5
dRR, CREDIT dRR, DEPOSITS
d2006, CREDIT d2006, DEPOSITS
step
 
Source: IMF staff calculations.  22 
  
Figure 8. Aggregate Model: Dynamic Impact of Selective Exogenous Variables 
(cont.) 
 









0 5 0 5
private bonds in soles, CREDIT private bonds in soles, DEPOSITS
treasuries 10-15, CREDIT treasuries 10-15, DEPOSITS
90% CI dynamic multipliers
step
Graphs by impulse variable, and response variable
 
Source: IMF staff calculations. 
 
 
b.  Cumulative dynamic multipliers 
 
confidence intervals
steps cdm Lower Upper cdm Lower Upper
inflation 0 -0.09 -0.22 0.03 0.22 -0.06 0.49
5 -0.09 -0.23 0.05 0.22 -0.02 0.46
0 -0.45 -0.73 -0.16 -0.72 -1.35 -0.09
5 -0.54 -0.88 -0.19 -0.49 -1.08 0.11
0 0.27 -0.08 0.61 0.41 -0.35 1.17
5 0.32 -0.08 0.71 0.28 -0.40 0.96
s 0 -0.49 -0.96 -0.03 0.34 -0.68 1.36
5 -0.52 -1.00 -0.04 0.46 -0.37 1.28
e 0 -0.08 -0.14 -0.03 0.01 -0.12 0.14
5 -0.09 -0.16 -0.02 0.04 -0.09 0.16
Δembi 0 0.00 -0.15 0.15 0.15 -0.18 0.48
5 0.01 -0.16 0.18 0.13 -0.16 0.43
5 0.06 -0.01 0.14 -0.04 -0.17 0.09
d10-15 0 -0.31 -0.52 -0.10 -0.25 -0.71 0.21
5 -0.35 -0.58 -0.13 -0.12 -0.50 0.27
d15-20 0 -0.01 -0.26 0.24 -0.17 -0.71 0.38
5 -0.02 -0.30 0.25 -0.14 -0.62 0.33
d20 0 -0.13 -0.38 0.12 0.18 -0.37 0.74
5 -0.13 -0.43 0.16 0.20 -0.30 0.70










Source: IMF staff calculations. 
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Figure 9. Six-Variable Model: Dynamic Impact of Selective Exogenous 
Variables 
 
a. Dynamic  multipliers 
 













0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5
depreciation, COMMERCIAL depreciation, MORTGAGE depreciation, SAVING depreciation, TIME
apreciation, COMMERCIAL apreciation, MORTGAGE apreciation, SAVING apreciation, TIME
s, COMMERCIAL s, MORTGAGE s, SAVING s, TIME
step
 
       Source: IMF staff calculations. 
 









0 5 0 5
dRRc, COMMERCIAL dRRc, MORTGAGE
d2006, COMMERCIAL d2006, MORTGAGE
90% CI dynamic multipliers
step
Graphs by impulse variable, and response variable
 
    Source: IMF staff calculations.  24 
  


















0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5
private in soles, COMMERCIAL private in soles, CONSUMPTION private in soles, MORTGAGE treasuries 10-15, COMMERCIAL
treasuries 10-15, CONSUMPTION treasuries 10-15, MORTGAGE treasuries 15-20, COMMERCIAL treasuries 15-20, CONSUMPTION
treasuries 15-20, MORTGAGE treasuries 20+, COMMERCIAL treasuries 20+, CONSUMPTION treasuries 20+, MORTGAGE
90% CI dynamic multipliers
step
Graphs by impulse variable, and response variable
 
       Source: IMF staff calculations.  25 
  
 
Figure 9. Six-Variable Model: Dynamic Impact of Selective Exogenous 
Variables (cont.) 
 




exogenous variables steps cdm Lower Upper cdm Lower Upper cdm Lower Upper
inflation 0 -0.10 -0.29 0.08 -0.07 -0.20 0.07 -0.07 -0.16 0.02
5 -0.05 -0.27 0.17 -0.11 -0.26 0.05 -0.11 -0.29 0.07
0 -0.62 -1.03 -0.22 0.20 -0.10 0.50 0.02 -0.18 0.23
5 -0.71 -1.22 -0.19 0.12 -0.25 0.48 -0.02 -0.44 0.40
0 0.23 -0.28 0.74 0.31 -0.06 0.69 0.37 0.12 0.63
5 0.21 -0.46 0.88 0.34 -0.13 0.82 0.70 0.16 1.24
s 0 -1.24 -1.99 -0.50 -0.12 -0.67 0.43 -1.03 -1.40 -0.66
5 -0.28 -1.07 0.50 -0.19 -0.75 0.36 -2.00 -2.63 -1.38
e 0 -0.11 -0.19 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.06
5 -0.13 -0.24 -0.03 -0.05 -0.12 0.03 0.03 -0.06 0.12
Δembi 0 0.23 0.01 0.44 -0.16 -0.31 0.00 -0.18 -0.29 -0.08
5 0.24 -0.03 0.52 -0.22 -0.42 -0.03 -0.38 -0.60 -0.16
ΔRRt 0 -0.28 -0.44 -0.11 0.10 -0.02 0.23 0.00 -0.08 0.08
5 -0.21 -0.36 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.16 -0.02 -0.15 0.11
d2006t 0 -0.31 -0.72 0.10 -0.10 -0.40 0.20 -0.23 -0.43 -0.02
5 -0.15 -0.62 0.33 -0.17 -0.51 0.17 -0.43 -0.82 -0.03
Δ share bonds in soles   0 0.15 0.06 0.25 -0.05 -0.12 0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.05
5 0.13 0.02 0.24 -0.03 -0.11 0.05 0.01 -0.08 0.10
d10-15 0 -0.53 -0.82 -0.24 0.20 -0.02 0.41 0.04 -0.11 0.18
5 -0.63 -0.95 -0.30 0.08 -0.15 0.31 0.00 -0.26 0.27
d15-20 0 -0.38 -0.76 -0.01 0.37 0.10 0.65 -0.11 -0.30 0.08
5 -0.18 -0.62 0.27 0.32 0.01 0.64 -0.33 -0.70 0.04
d20 0 -0.36 -0.74 0.01 0.19 -0.08 0.47 -0.08 -0.27 0.11
5 -0.22 -0.67 0.23 0.05 -0.27 0.38 -0.24 -0.62 0.13
 
exogenous variables steps cdm Lower Upper cdm Lower Upper cdm Lower Upper
inflation 0 -0.40 -0.85 0.06 -0.17 -0.44 0.11 0.93 0.46 1.39
5 0.03 -0.28 0.33 -0.02 -0.26 0.21 0.57 0.20 0.94
0 -0.22 -1.23 0.79 -0.31 -0.92 0.31 -1.04 -2.09 0.01
5 -0.25 -0.95 0.45 -0.23 -0.77 0.31 -0.65 -1.51 0.22
0 0.65 -0.63 1.92 0.64 -0.14 1.42 0.95 -0.37 2.27
5 0.52 -0.42 1.45 0.79 0.08 1.50 1.20 0.05 2.34
s 0 -1.66 -3.51 0.19 0.92 -0.21 2.05 0.64 -1.28 2.56
5 -0.82 -1.93 0.30 0.47 -0.38 1.31 -0.21 -1.57 1.15
e 0 0.08 -0.13 0.29 -0.01 -0.14 0.12 -0.01 -0.23 0.20
5 0.08 -0.07 0.23 0.02 -0.10 0.13 0.03 -0.15 0.22
Δembi 0 0.79 0.26 1.31 -0.39 -0.71 -0.07 0.16 -0.39 0.70
5 0.47 0.09 0.85 -0.35 -0.65 -0.06 -0.26 -0.74 0.21
ΔRRt 0 -0.01 -0.42 0.40 0.14 -0.11 0.39 0.28 -0.14 0.71
5 0.09 -0.12 0.31 0.21 0.04 0.37 0.30 0.04 0.55
d2006t 0 -0.71 -1.74 0.31 -0.27 -0.89 0.36 1.10 0.04 2.16
5 -0.09 -0.74 0.56 -0.12 -0.62 0.38 0.53 -0.27 1.32
Δ share bonds in soles   0 0.13 -0.11 0.37 -0.02 -0.16 0.13 -0.08 -0.33 0.17
5 0.04 -0.12 0.19 -0.05 -0.17 0.07 -0.10 -0.29 0.09
d10-15 0 -0.21 -0.93 0.52 -0.61 -1.05 -0.17 -0.10 -0.85 0.65
5 -0.01 -0.45 0.44 -0.31 -0.66 0.03 -0.06 -0.61 0.49
d15-20 0 0.53 -0.40 1.46 0.22 -0.35 0.79 -0.42 -1.38 0.55
5 0.17 -0.44 0.78 0.23 -0.24 0.70 -0.31 -1.06 0.45
d20 0 0.79 -0.14 1.72 0.11 -0.46 0.68 0.40 -0.56 1.36
5 0.57 -0.04 1.19 0.25 -0.22 0.72 0.28 -0.47 1.04
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